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Abstract. Online mass surveillance by governmental organizations is 
omnipresent. Even though this results in a loss of privacy and further negative 
outcomes for individuals, a majority is justifying mass surveillance. 
Understanding, why this is the case is among others important for individuals, 
who want to decrease justification of mass surveillance. Therefore, this study 
aims to uncover the factors that drive this justification. Drawing on system 
justification theory we consider mass surveillance to be a political arrangement. 
Five factors were identified that potentially drive individuals’ justification of 
mass surveillance which are among others, perceived privacy control or 
perceived security. A quantitative study was carried out and the results support 
most of our hypotheses. With our results, we contribute to the privacy-related 
area in the domain of IS, by indicating that individuals consider mass 
surveillance not necessarily to be bad and by giving advice on how to alter the 
level of justification. 
Keywords: mass surveillance, system justification theory, privacy, nothing to 
hide, justification 
1 Introduction 
Governmental organizations have created a system of online mass surveillance. That 
means, these organizations analyze a vast size of information sent over the Internet 
without suspicion [1]. The result of this mass surveillance is that a majority of 
individuals thinks they are having almost no privacy anymore [2]. This reduced privacy 
results in disadvantages such as profiling, manipulation [3] or chilling effects [4]. For 
example, among others, individuals do not search online for certain issues such as 
‘terrorism’ anymore because they are afraid becoming a target of governmental 
organizations [4]. To protect one’s own privacy, one might thus assume that individuals 
reject mass surveillance e.g. by protesting against it.  
However, although individuals rate their privacy as very important [2], surveys 
indicate that more individuals are justifying, i.e. defending and warranting, mass 
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surveillance rather than rejecting it [5, 6], e.g. by protesting against it [7]. What is good 
for governmental organizations, who have an interest to keep mass surveillance [8], is 
bad for individuals’ privacy [9].  
Therefore, both parties – individuals and governmental organizations – need to 
understand what factors drive individuals’ justification of mass surveillance. Then both 
might have the chance to either change these factors to change the level of justification 
or to keep these factors to keep the level of justification. Either way, for both parties it 
is necessary to understand:  
What factors drive individuals to justify mass surveillance? 
To answer the research question we rely on the one hand on previous research on 
mass surveillance [6, 10–13]. There, perceived security has been suggested as one of 
the main factors determining justification of mass surveillance [10, 11, 13]. Yet, this 
factor has only been suggested and has not been supported scientifically. On the other 
hand, mass surveillance is a method that is used to monitor a population of individuals, 
approved and ordered by governmental organizations [14]. Although also companies 
from the private sector can use mass surveillance technologies, we focus on mass 
surveillance being a political arrangement as an ordinance by the government. To find 
out why individuals justify mass surveillance, typical theories from information system 
(IS) research in the privacy domain cannot be applied [15]. This is because these 
theories usually focus on an actual IS. In this study, it is more about mass surveillance 
as a political arrangement. That is why in this research study we refer to system 
justification theory (SJT) [16–18]. 
Thus, in the following, we will provide information on SJT as well as mass 
surveillance and discuss both research streams together to understand mass surveillance 
justification. A quantitative study is then carried out, using workers from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (mTurk). Based on the results, we then contribute to theory by 
providing factors that are important in a mass surveillance context. 
2 Theoretical Background 
We next provide information on the system justification theory (SJT) [16, 17]. We 
continue with research on mass surveillance before carving out the research gap.  
2.1 System Justification Theory 
System justification: The justification of a system means that individuals defend, 
bolster or warrant a system [18]. A system is defined as existing social, economic, and 
political institutions and arrangements. It can range from small-scale systems, such as 
a nuclear family up to an entire nation [19]. System justification is therefore defined as 
defending, bolstering or warranting existing social, economic, and political institutions 
and arrangements. 
SJT is a theory to explain why individuals justify a system [17]. Thereby, alternatives 
of the status quo are degraded. Individuals do so because they have social and 
psychological needs to consider a system as being legitimate and as being good, fair, 
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natural, desirable, and inevitable [16–18]. They also want to reduce anxiety, guilt, 
dissonance, discomfort and uncertainty [17].  
Prior privacy-research in the domain of IS has not been using SJT in their research 
studies [15]. In other research domains, SJT has been used to explain justification of 
different systems including political systems [17], financial work systems [18] or 
economic systems such as meritocracies [20]. Three factors mainly influence system 
justification: the perceived powerlessness, the perceived need for order and stability 
and the perceived dangerousness of the world. 
 Perceived powerlessness: Power refers to having asymmetric control over 
particular resources [21]. Individuals, who are in a status of power, are able to process 
information and to make decision, with the goal to maintain the current position in the 
system. The more powerful an individual is the more she has access to resources to 
control her own position [21]. Previous research on SJT has especially researched on 
individuals who are in a status of perceived powerlessness, i.e. on those individuals 
who do not have control over particular resources because of living in a particular 
system [18]. SJT thereby indicates that powerless individuals still justify the system 
and sometimes even more justify it than powerful individuals, although it is the system, 
that reduces their power. For example, individuals, who are financially deprived by the 
current system nevertheless believe in meritocracies [20].  
Perceived need for order and stability: Individuals, who have a perceived need 
for order and stability, have the perception that the environment they live in should be 
orderly, well-structured and unambiguous. If decisions are made they have a desire to 
stick with these decisions [17].  
Perceived dangerousness of the world: Individuals, who think that they live in a 
dangerous world, have the perception that life is fiercely competitive and ultimately 
believe that others are constantly threatening to harm them [22]. These individuals have 
a heightened sensitivity to potential dangers in the social environment, including threats 
of violence, and terrorism, and have permanent concerns about being in danger [17].  
To theorize the relation between system justification theory and mass surveillance, 
we provide detailed information on mass surveillance in the following section.  
2.2 Related Work on Mass Surveillance and Research Gaps 
Mass surveillance is generally defined as any method, that collects information of a 
population, without any attempts to limit the surveillance to a particular individual, but 
rather to monitor an entire group of individuals [14]. Mass surveillance in an online 
context has become a major topic in society1, through revelations proving evidence on 
how the National Security Agency (NSA) of the USA conduct mass surveillance. Yet, 
also governmental organizations of other countries conduct mass surveillance on 
individuals worldwide. It is known that governmental organizations worldwide, 
                                                          
1 Several EU projects have been conducted to better understand the issue of mass surveillance 
(please see http://www.projectpact.eu/; http://surprise-project.eu/ and 
https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/102282_de.html). 
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essentially store and examine a vast amount of information, which is sent over the 
Internet, without suspicion [1].  
Mass surveillance thereby violates individuals’ privacy, whereas privacy is a multi-
facet concept [23]. However, in IS research, privacy is usually defined as the amount 
of control an individual has over her personal information [24], expressed by privacy 
control [25]. Since mass surveillance takes place by examining information, individuals 
have often lost control over their information, and thus also over their privacy. 
Through mass surveillance, individuals suffer from several disadvantages. For 
example, individuals search less for delicate issues such as ‘terrorists’ on the Internet 
because they are afraid of becoming a target of governmental organizations [4]. Also, 
discrimination, profiling or manipulation can occur through mass surveillance [3]. Still, 
it is indicated that more individuals justify mass surveillance rather than oppose it [5], 
e.g. by protesting against it. 
To find out, in how far previous literature has been researching on the topic of mass 
surveillance justification, we conducted a literature review2, and identified several 
articles [6, 10–13, 26–29]. The studies cover topics such as coping with mass 
surveillance or factors leading to the disapproval of mass surveillance. Still, although 
covering different issues, all articles commonly suggest two factors that need to be 
considered when researching on mass surveillance:  
Perceived security: Several studies have indicated that increased security in 
everyday life through mass surveillance might be an important factor why individuals 
justify mass surveillance. Thereby, it is about the perception of individuals that security 
is enhanced through mass surveillance [10, 11, 13, 28, 29]. This is in line with 
governmental organizations which state that through mass surveillance, objective 
security, such as less terrorist activities, is increased [8].  
Nothing to hide: Several studies introduce the concept of ‘I have nothing to hide’. 
This refers to individuals, who state that they have no problem with governmental 
organizations examining their information, because they think have no information to 
conceal [10, 11, 27]. Rather they think that only criminals would have something to 
hide, which would then justify it to spy on it [10].  
Research gap: In sum, scholars have already researched on individuals’ attitude 
towards mass surveillance and have therefore strengthened our understanding on this 
topic. They have particularly indicated that perceived security and the concept of 
‘nothing to hide’ could be important factors in the context of mass surveillance [10, 11, 
13, 28, 29]. However, there is scarcity on how these or other factors of the SJT lead to 
the justification of mass surveillance. We therefore theorize on justification of mass 
surveillance based on the SJT and the mentioned research on mass surveillance. 
3 Theorizing on Justification of Mass Surveillance 
In this research study, we use SJT to find out what determines an individual to justify 
mass surveillance. However, when using a rather general theory in a more particular 
                                                          
2 The literature review covered the AIS basket of eight, ICIS, HICSS, ECIS and WI proceedings, 
alongside with a general search on Google Scholar.  
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context, it is usually inevitable to adapt the theory to the particular context [30]. 
Therefore, when using SJT to explain mass surveillance, we will on the one hand adapt 
the existing concepts when necessary. On the other hand, we will add two concepts that 
are suggested by previous literature on mass surveillance [6, 10–13, 26–29] to better 
explain the dependent variable.  
Thereby, we consider mass surveillance to be a system in the sense of the SJT. That 
means we consider mass surveillance as an existing political arrangement. Individuals, 
using the Internet, live in the system of mass surveillance, because through mass 
surveillance as a political arrangement, they are monitored while using the Internet. 
Therefore, in light of SJT, justification of a system refers to justification of mass 
surveillance. Based on previous research on SJT and mass surveillance, we define it as 
the motivation of individuals to defend, bolster or warrant existing political 
arrangements, allowing mass surveillance, conducted by governmental organizations 
such as intelligence agencies [16, 29].  
Furthermore, we include powerlessness of individuals, which needs to be adapted to 
the particular context [30]. For example, an individual who is smart but has no physical 
strength, is powerful on the resource ‘information’ but powerless on the resource 
‘strength’. In this study, we research in the context of mass surveillance and privacy of 
individuals. Privacy of individuals is defined as having control over ones’ own personal 
information, expressed by privacy control [24, 25]. Mass surveillance – the system in 
this study – is reducing privacy and thus the amount of control over privacy. In SJT, 
powerlessness refers to the power individuals have but that is reduced by the system. 
Therefore, in this study, since mass surveillance reduces the power over one’s own 
privacy, we conceptualize powerlessness as the perceived loss of privacy control.  
We also include both perceptions perceived need for order and stability as well as 
the perceived dangerousness of the world. Both perceptions do not need to be adapted 
to a particular context as they are independent of the situation [17]. 
Besides the components of the SJT, previous research on mass surveillance suggests 
two factors, that need to be considered when conducting research on mass surveillance: 
On the one hand, many individuals think that mass surveillance increases security [28, 
29]. This could have an influence on individuals’ justification of mass surveillance [13]. 
We therefore include the component perceived security and define it as the perception 
of an individual that through the conduction of mass surveillance there will be increased 
security, e.g. less crime or terrorist activities [28, 29]. On the other hand, the argument 
of many people that they have nothing to hide is also suggested to be an important 
concept in the context of mass surveillance [10, 11]. We therefore include the concept 
of nothing to hide, and define it as the perception of an individual that she has no 
information to conceal in front of governmental organizations [10, 11].  
Based on these concepts, we build our research model. The research model also 
includes prior disclosure as a control variable. This concept is defined as the amount 
of information, individuals have disclosed in the past on the Internet [31]. With this 
variable, we aim to control for, in how the participants have disclosed information on 
the Internet at all, to account for in how far mass surveillance is even an issue for them. 
In case they have not disclosed information on the Internet before, it might influence 
their justification of mass surveillance. Furthermore, as has also been done by previous 
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privacy research [e.g., 31] we also controlled for gender and age. This is because 
previous research has shown that gender [32] as well as age [24] are variables which 
often influence attitudes of individuals in a privacy context. Therefore, it is 
recommended to generally control for them. Hypotheses for the research model are 
explicated in the following. 
Individuals, who are high on perceived loss of privacy control have the perception 
that they are not able to govern their own personal information. Mass surveillance is a 
factor, which decreases privacy control [26, 29], because a vast amount of information 
is captured, stored and examined by governmental organizations, without the control of 
the individual [1, 29]. Previous research has shown that individuals, who do not have 
access to needed resources and who are therefore powerless, paradoxically more justify 
the system, which causes their powerlessness [18]. Individuals, who are high on 
perceived loss of privacy control, i.e. who are in a less powerful state, will therefore 
also more justify mass surveillance, which causes their powerlessness. They do so to 
better maintain a positive image about their situation even if it is not positive at all [18]. 
We hypothesize: 
 
H1: Perceived loss of privacy control increases justification of mass surveillance. 
 
Having a high need for order and stability means that these individuals want to 
maintain their status quo [17]. Mass surveillance is considered to be the system, which 
represents the current status quo. Individuals do not want mass surveillance to stop, 
because then the status quo is changed, they might need to adapt, and uncertainty arises 
[33]. This is because one does not know what would happen after mass surveillance has 
stopped. For example, less security or publishing the results of mass surveillance, 
would all change the current status quo. Continuing mass surveillance as it is, would at 
least maintain the status quo even at the expense of decreased privacy. Hence, 
individuals who have a high need for order and stability, more justify mass surveillance. 
This is also aligned with the SJT [17] and previous research, suggesting that the need 
for social order can result in the justification of mass surveillance [28, 29]. We 
hypothesize:  
 
H2: Perceived need for order and stability increases justification of mass 
surveillance.  
 
Individuals, who think that they are living in a dangerous world, do see the world as 
threatening. They think that through certain events, they are under severe danger 
causing harm. For example, crime activities or terrorist attacks are those events, which 
increase the perception of severe danger to those individuals [34]. Individuals, who 
think that they live in a dangerous world, do have that perception across different 
situations. However, they welcome practices which would reduce their perception, and 
which fights against that dangerous world. Mass surveillance is said to fight against the 
dangerous world [26]. This will make them more likely to justify it, which is also 
aligned with basic premises of the SJT [17]. We hypothesize: 
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H3: Perceived dangerousness of the world increases justification of mass 
surveillance. 
 
If individuals think, that there will be more security through mass surveillance, they 
will also be more likely to justify mass surveillance. This is because increased security 
is seen as one of the main benefits out of mass surveillance [13]. For example, it is said 
that through mass surveillance, crime or terrorist activities are reduced, by identifying 
subjects and forestalling potential crime or terrorist activities [8]. To gain that benefit, 
individuals will be more likely to justify mass surveillance, which is also suggested by 
previous research [10, 11, 13, 28, 29]. We hypothesize:  
 
H4: Perceived security increases justification of mass surveillance. 
 
Individuals, who have something to hide, do not want their information to be read 
by others, e.g., governmental organizations [10, 11]. Therefore, they value their privacy 
in terms of that they want to control their information. Mass surveillance is against 
individuals, who have something to hide, because mass surveillance allows 
governmental organizations to jeopardize individuals’ privacy, and to read their private 
information [10, 11, 27]. Hence, individuals, who have something to hide, will be less 
likely to justify mass surveillance. The other way around, individuals, who state they 
have nothing to hide, will therefore be more likely to justify mass surveillance. They 
see less disadvantages from mass surveillance, and rather think that as long as they do 
not do something wrong, governmental organizations should be allowed to examine 
information sent over the Internet [10]. We hypothesize:  
 
H5: Nothing to hide increases justification of mass surveillance.  
 
To evaluate our research model (see Figure 2) we conducted a quantitative study. 
The methodology therefor is explained in the following section.  
4 Methodology 
We aim to research on why individuals justify mass surveillance. To do so we 
conducted a quantitative survey. The used items are depicted in Table 1. To conduct 
the survey, we used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) because it is considered to be 
equivalent to similar data collection methods [35] and it has also been successfully used 
in a privacy context [36]. We followed the guidelines of previous research to conduct 
the survey, e.g., by only letting participants take part which have a very high number 
of already completed tasks. We told workers of MTurk that the maximum time for 
completing the task will be 12 minutes. Payment was $0.25 for each worker. 141 
participants took party in our survey, whereas only these participants who provided 
answers to at least 90 percent of the questions were kept. All others were removed. 
After cleaning the data, we ended up with 135 participants in total. Participants were 
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30.88 years old on average, with a standard deviation of 9.64 years. 38 female 
participants and 97 male participants took part in our survey.  
Table 1. Items and Loadings 
Construct Item Loadings 
Justification of 
mass 
surveillance 
[13] 
Intelligence agencies needs to have access to individual bank accounts. 0.840 
Intelligence agencies need wiretapping authority. 0.923 
Intelligence agencies needs to have authority to use high tech surveillance tools for Internet 
eavesdropping. 
0.909 
Perceived loss 
of privacy 
control 
[25] 
I do not have control over who can get access to my personal information I provided on the 
Internet. 
0.727 
I do not have control over how personal information is used by other parties on the Internet. 0.991 
I do not have control over my personal information provided on the Internet. 0.816 
Need for order 
and stability 
[37] 
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 0.868 
I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place. 0.871 
I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 0.789 
Perceived 
dangerousness 
of the world 
[34] 
Every day as society becomes more lawless and bestial, a person’s chances of being robbed, 
assaulted, and even murdered go up and up. 
0.907 
It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and more 
persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else. 
0.900 
My knowledge and experience tell me that the social world we live in is basically a dangerous 
and unpredictable place, in which good, decent, and moral people’s values and way of life are 
threatened and disrupted by bad people. 
0.844 
Perceived 
security 
[38, 39] 
Mass surveillance by intelligence agencies is good for protecting our country. 0.918 
When conducting mass surveillance, our country is more likely to be protected. 0.951 
Continuous mass surveillance by intelligence agencies lessens the chances of terrorist attacks. 0.902 
Nothing to hide 
[40] 
Last item was 
self-developed  
People who obey the law have nothing to fear from mass surveillance. 0.945 
Only criminals have any reason to be afraid of mass surveillance. 0.920 
I do not have anything to hide when it comes to mass surveillance by intelligence agencies.  0.678 
(dropped) 
For the analysis of the survey, we used SmartPLS 3.2.6. The reason is that we also 
asked for negative perceptions such as loss of privacy control which can skew results 
[41]. Details and results are given in the following section.  
5 Results 
To test our research model, we first accounted for common method bias (CMB) 
followed by the evaluation of the measurement model and the structural model.  
Common method bias: We first conducted the Harman’s Single-Factor Test, which 
indicates that 30.46 percent is explained by one factor which shows no indication of 
CMB [42]. We also accounted for the Unmeasured Latent Marker Construct 
techniques. The average R² with the CMB factor is 0.0027 higher than without the CMB 
factor. As the R² excluding the CMB factor is 0.79135, the ratio is 1:293. Therefore, 
CMB seems to be no issue [43].  
Measurement model: To account for a valid measurement model, we checked on 
the following criteria: 1) Indicator reliability. The threshold of each indicator should 
be 0.707 to account for at least 50 percent of the variance of the latent variable [44]. As 
shown in Table 1, this was the case except for one item of ‘Nothing to hide’ which was 
dropped in the further evaluation. 2) Composite reliability (CR) and average variance 
extracted (AVE). CR should be above 0.7 and AVE should be above 0.5 [45] which is 
both the case as one can see in Table 2. 3) Discriminant validity. To make sure that all 
constructs differ from each other, the square root of AVE needs to be greater than the 
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correlation between the constructs [45, 46]. This is also the case as depicted in Table 2. 
We also computed the heterotrait-monotrait ratio [HTMT, 47]. When using the most 
conservative approach HTMT0.85, we see no signs of discriminant validity since the 
highest value is between perceived security and ‘Nothing to hide’ with 0.742. As all 
requirements are fulfilled, we conclude that our measurement model is valid.  
Table 2. AVE, CR and bivariate correlations 
 Mean St.d. AVE CR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Justification of mass 
surveillance 
3.48 1.89 0.794 0.920 0.891         
2 Perceived loss of 
privacy control 
4.98 1.63 0.725 0.886 -0.138 0.852        
3 Need for order and 
stability 
5.07 1.33 0.712 0.881 0.250 -0.004 0.844       
4 Perceived 
dangerousness of the 
world 
4.19 1.53 0.782 0.915 0.478 -0.060 0.289 0.884      
5 Perceived security 4.37 1.73 0.854 0.946 0.728 -0.125 0.099 0.475 0.924     
6 Nothing to hide 4.22 2.03 0.908 0.952 0.601 -0.089 0.125 0.450 0.742 0.953    
7 Prior disclosure 3.96 1.74 0.790 0.919 0.187 0.096 -0.031 0.248 0.290 0.161 0.889   
8 Age 30.88 9.64 n/a n/a -0.010 0.122 0.007 0.098 0.119 0.163 -0.099 n/a  
9 Gender  
(1=male, 2 = female) 
1.28 0.45 n/a n/a 0.090 -0.025 0.122 -0.003 0.079 0.026 0.109 0.048 n/a 
The diagonal bold values represent the square root of the AVE of the corresponding constructs. 
n/a cannot be computed because these are single-item constructs 
 
Structural model: To evaluate the structural model, we checked on the variance 
extracted (R²) of the dependent variable as well as the significance level of each path 
coefficient. Please see Figure 1 for an overview.  
The results reveal that 56.6 percent of the variance of justification of mass 
surveillance is explained. H1 is not supported as the path coefficient is not significant. 
 Perceived loss of 
privacy control (as 
powerlessness)
Perceived need for 
order and stability
Perceived 
dangerousness of the 
world
Justification of mass 
surveillance 
(as system justification)
R²=56.6%
H2: 0.139**
H3: 0.150*
H1: -0.040ns
Perceived security
Nothing to hide
H4: 0.495***
Gender
-0.116**
H5: 0.175*
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.025; * p<0.05; ns p>=0.05
Age Prior disclosure
0.037ns 0.009ns
System justification theory
Previous research on mass surveillance
Control variables
Figure 1. Structural model 
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Besides, the results support all other remaining hypotheses, i.e. H2, H3, H4 as well as 
H5. Moreover, the results indicate that gender and prior disclosure as control variables, 
do not significantly influence justification of mass surveillance. However, age as a 
control variable has a significant, negative impact. This means that the older the 
individual, the less likely the justification of mass surveillance.  
These results have implications for both, theory and practice, which will be 
discussed in the following section.  
6 Discussion 
A majority of individuals is justifying mass surveillance by governmental 
organizations [5, 6] despite a reduce in one’s own privacy [2]. This can lead to further 
challenges to the individual such as profiling, manipulation [3] or chilling effects [4]. 
Finding out, why individuals justify mass surveillance, is important for the individuals 
themselves, in case they want to change their attitude on mass surveillance. Also, for 
governmental institutions who have an interest in keeping mass surveillance, the results 
can be important. Scholars have thus already put some research on mass surveillance 
[10–13]. Yet, research on justification of mass surveillance is rather scarce [15].  
In this research study, we therefore concentrated on factors driving justification of 
mass surveillance. We consider mass surveillance to be a political arrangement, and 
therefore to be a system in the sense of the system justification theory (SJT) [16]. To 
use SJT in our research study, we follow previous recommendations to adapt a general 
theory to a particular context [30], by adapting existing concepts and by adding new 
concepts from literature on mass surveillance [10, 11, 13, 28, 29]. After having 
evaluated our research model, we are able to answer our research question which is 
what factors drive individuals to justify mass surveillance? 
Our results indicate that perceived security is the major concept increasing 
justification of mass surveillance. Hence, if individuals have the perception that through 
mass surveillance, security is about to increase, then they are more likely to justify it. 
Also, individuals who have nothing to hide have a higher probability to justify mass 
surveillance. In addition to these two concepts from research on mass surveillance, two 
factors from SJT are also drivers of justification of mass surveillance: Individuals, who 
have a higher need for order and stability as well as individuals who perceive the world 
to be dangerous, are more likely to justify mass surveillance. Besides, perceived loss of 
privacy control has no influence on justification of mass surveillance. That means, even 
if individuals have the perception that through mass surveillance, they have lost control 
over their privacy, it does not have an effect on their justification of mass surveillance. 
These results have implications for theory in the area of IS, and specifically in the 
privacy-related domain, as well as for practice.  
6.1 Implications for Theory 
Mass surveillance is a system in the sense of the SJT: SJT has been used in a 
variety of settings outside of the IS domain, predominantly in the area of political 
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science [17, 18, 20]. With this research study, we bring SJT to the area of IS research, 
by conceptualizing mass surveillance to be a political arrangement, and thus a system 
in the sense of SJT. Scholars, researching on justification of mass surveillance, can 
therefore also rely on SJT in their future research studies. With this, they are able to 
rely on additional factors [19] that could be used with SJT, to gain a further 
understanding of justification of mass surveillance.  
Individuals who have a need for order and stability consider mass surveillance 
to be the current status quo: Individuals who are having a higher need for order and 
stability want to maintain their current status quo [17]. Since these individuals are more 
likely to justify mass surveillance, we conclude that they consider mass surveillance to 
be the current status quo, which they want to maintain. Based on this implication, 
scholars could use other theories, such as status quo bias theory which has already been 
applied in IS research [48] or related factors such as right-wing authoritarianism or 
conservatism [34], to further understand justification of mass surveillance.  
Mass surveillance does not have to be a bad thing for individuals: Previous 
research, including this study, has assumed that mass surveillance is perceived to be 
negative by individuals, due to privacy issues [e.g. 10]. However, our results indicate 
that individuals do not necessarily consider mass surveillance to be a bad thing. 
Individuals think that through mass surveillance, the world might become less 
dangerous, and perceived security might increase, which is why they justify it. 
Especially the latter is a factor, that has often been suggested by previous research [13, 
26, 28, 29]. However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to explicitly 
demonstrate that impact on justification of mass surveillance. Hence, if scholars in the 
domain of IS, aim to take mass surveillance as something individuals perceive to be 
negative, or aim to use it to fear individuals [38], they should put caution on it. 
Researchers should rather check in how far individuals really consider mass 
surveillance to be a bad thing or if they do not more consider it to be positive.  
Loss of privacy control has no impact on justification of mass surveillance: One 
explanation for that could be, that loss of privacy control does not adequately reflect 
powerlessness. Powerlessness might also refer to other concepts, e.g., when it comes to 
the question of who is able to examine information. The majority of individuals is 
producing information, yet, only a minority of individuals is powerful enough to 
examine that information. Also, other conceptualizations, such as political power, 
might better serve as the conceptualization of powerlessness. Another explanation for 
the non-supported hypothesis would assume, that loss of privacy control does correctly 
reflect powerlessness. However, powerlessness has no impact on justification in a 
system of mass surveillance. Previous research on SJT has shown that powerlessness 
does not always have to lead to more justification of the system [19]. Different reasons 
have been provided, e.g. when individuals are more ego-centered [18]. Scholars could 
go deeper into that issue, by applying SJT, and use explanations for the non-significant 
effects of powerlessness. Independent of that, the results imply for scholars in the 
domain of IS, that when researching on mass surveillance outside of SJT, a loss of 
privacy control could be left out in a research model.  
Besides theoretical implications, this study also provides practical implications.  
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6.2 Implications for Practice 
Two practical implications arise from this study:  
1) Perceived security needs to be aligned with objective security. In case 
individuals want to change their positive attitude on justification of mass surveillance, 
they might want to ask themselves, in how far mass surveillance actually increases 
security. For example, so far, evidence on increased objective security through mass 
surveillance is rather scarce [49]. Therefore, we recommend individuals to check on, in 
how far their level of perceived security is aligned with the actual level of objective 
security through mass surveillance.  
2) Individuals who have the need for order and stability consider mass 
surveillance to be current status quo. Changing the status quo will bring additional 
problems. Therefore, in case governmental organizations are focusing on individuals, 
who have a high need for order and stability, they could try to just let things going 
without changing anything. This is because individuals often try to keep the current 
status quo [48].  
After having discussed the implications of this study, we will now focus on 
limitations and future research possibilities.  
6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
This research study uses prior disclosure as a variable to control for, in how far the 
amount of information disclosed, has an impact on justification of mass surveillance. 
The results indicate no impact, yet, future research could still concentrate on other 
demographic variables of the participants, such as the country they are living in, to find 
out in how far there are differences in the justification of mass surveillance. 
Furthermore, age as a control variable indicates that the older the individual the less 
likely she will be to justify mass surveillance. We did not hypothesize on that 
relationship, yet, future research might more elaborate on these thoughts. One reason 
could be that older individuals know more how life is without the Internet, and without 
online mass surveillance, and therefore value that more.  
Besides, this research study has concentrated on factors, driving the justification of 
mass surveillance. If one wants to actually change the level of justification, one could 
focus on these factors. Future research could thus try to find out, what determines the 
level of these factors, to then present actual recommendations on how to influence the 
level of justification of mass surveillance. Furthermore, future research could also 
expand the definition of mass surveillance, to not only focus on governmental 
organizations but also include private companies which might also use mass 
surveillance technologies [e.g., 50]. This could also be done, by focusing on designated 
journals, which are outside the domain of IS, but which particularly focus on mass 
surveillance. Future research could on the other hand also focus on the term 
governmental organizations, by better specifying that term and digging deeper into 
what particular governmental organizations conduct mass surveillance. In addition, this 
study has focused on studies in the domain of IS. Future research could also elaborate 
on other sources outside this domain. Plus, this research study has analyzed the results 
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using a PLS approach. However, other approaches such as the ordinary least squares 
approach (OLS), might also be suitable. Therefore, future research might also consider 
using other methodologies than PLS, such as OLS.  
In sum, this study has researched on factors, driving justification of mass 
surveillance. Based on SJT and previous research on mass surveillance, several drivers 
of mass surveillance justification have been provided, alongside with implications for 
theory and practice.  
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